Werecommend that the statute of limitations be eliminated for thefollowing crimes committed against children: 1) Rape, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3121; 2) Statutory Sexual Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3122; 3) InvoluntaryDeviate Sexual Intercourse, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3123; 4) Sexual Assault, 18Pa. C.S.A. § 3124.1; 5) Aggravated Indecent Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3125; 6) Indecent Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3126 (where the offenseconstitutes a course of conduct); 7) Sexual Exploitation of Children,18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6320; 8) Endangering Welfare of Children, 18 Pa. C.S.A.§ 4304; and 9) Corruption of Minors, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301.  EndangeringWelfare of Children and Corruption of Minors also punish non-sexualconduct.  We would eliminate the statute of limitations for thesecrimes only as they relate to the sexual abuse of children or exposureof children to potential sexual abuse.

Powerfulpsychological forces often prevent child sexual abuse victims fromreporting the abuse until well into adulthood, if at all.  Many victimsfeel that their abuse is their fault; many feel that they should notget their abusers into trouble; many are ashamed of their abuse; andmany simply repress for decades any memories of the abuse.  The harmthat sexual abusers inflict on their child victims distinguishes crimesof sexual abuse of children from other crimes for which it is fair toimpose a statute of limitations.

Tomaintain a statute of limitations for crimes involving the sexual abuseof children would be to reward abusers who choose children, the mostdefenseless victims.  Because the harm inflicted by child sexual abuseis so deep and child victims are so vulnerable, the existence of anystatute of limitations, however long, virtually ensures that somecrimes will not be timely reported and too many abusers will never haveto pay for their crimes.  It is time to stop giving a pass to childabusers who count on the statute of limitations and the fears andimmaturity of their victims to avoid criminal liability.

Noconstitutional provision or other law would prevent Pennsylvania fromeliminating the statute of limitations for sexual crimes committedagainst children.  Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for otherserious crimes:  murder, voluntary manslaughter, conspiracy to commitmurder or solicitation to commit murder if a murder results from theconspiracy or solicitation, any felony perpetrated in connection with amurder of the first or second degree, and fatal vehicular accidentswhere the accused is the driver.  There is no reason the Legislaturecould not determine that any or all crimes of child sexual abuse areserious enough to merit the elimination of the statute of limitations.

Moreover,several other states have statutes of limitations that allow childsexual abuse prosecutions regardless of when the abuse occurred. Somestates, such as South Carolina and Wyoming, do not have criminalstatutes of limitations at all. Some states, such as Kentucky and WestVirginia, have no statute of limitations for felony offenses. Somestates have specifically enacted legislation abolishing statutes oflimitations for some or all sexual crimes committed against children.Thus, Alabama has no statute of limitation for any sex offenseinvolving a victim younger than sixteen; Maine has no statute oflimitations for incest, unlawful sexual contact, sexual abuse of aminor, rape or gross sexual assault committed against children youngerthan sixteen; Alaska has no statute of limitations for felony sexualabuse of a minor; and Rhode Island has no statute of limitations forrape, first degree sexual assault, or first or second degree childmolestation sexual assault. Evena former official of the Archdiocese has recognized the need for thisproposal.  Edward Cullen, who was Cardinal Bevilacqua's Vicar ofAdministration, and who has since himself been elevated to bishop, wasasked about the issue during his grand jury testimony.  "I think itwould be good for society if they had no statute of limitations,"acknowledged Bishop Cullen.  "I really do.  Yes, I do."

It isdistressing that a technical, procedural, and somewhat arbitrary rule,a statute of limitations, is the primary barrier precluding theprosecution of priests who sexually abused minors and those who coveredup the crimes and allowed them to occur.  Whatever justifications existfor statutes of limitation, those justifications are clearly outweighedwhere the sexual abuse of children is concerned.  Society's interestand responsibility in protecting its children is paramount.

In 1996,the Legislature amended the crime of endangering welfare of children toprovide that those who commit endangering as a course of conduct areguilty of a felony of the third degree.  We recommend, if the statuteis unclear, that a clause be added providing that a person commitsendangering as a course of conduct where he endangers at least twochildren once or one child twice.  We further recommend that a person"supervising the welfare of a child" be defined to include:  1) aperson who has direct contact with a child or children, and 2) a person who employs or otherwise supervises a person who has direct contact with a child or children.

Theproposed amendments are designed to address two potential problems withthe existing statute.  First, we believe that, where a supervisorplaces a child in continuing contact with a person known to represent arisk to children, that placement constitutes multiple acts and,therefore, endangerment as a course of conduct.  Second, we believe itwill be helpful to clarify that even a person who does not directlycome into contact with a child may nevertheless be supervising thewelfare of the child in a very real sense.  An Archdiocesan leader,daycare supervisor or Boy Scout official can endanger the welfare of achild without having direct day-to-day contact with children.

Wealso recommend one further expansion of the offense of endangeringwelfare of children.  Currently, the statute limits liability to thosewho "knowingly" place a child in danger.  As our investigationdemonstrates, however, it isn't hard for the people at the top – thepeople with real power, who should have real responsibility – to closetheir eyes to danger, enabling them to claim that they lacked"knowledge."  We believe that, given the vulnerability of children,reckless disregard should be sufficient to create exposure to criminalliability.

3.  Increase the penalty for indecent assault.

Werecommend amendment of the indecent assault statute, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §3126, to provide that, if the indecent contact with the victim is acourse of conduct, it will be graded as a felony of the second degreewhere the victim is less than 13 years of age, and a felony of thethird degree where the victim is older than 13.  A spur-of-the-momentgrab is obviously a very different crime than a long-term effort toexploit a relationship for unwelcome physical contact.  The grading ofthe offense should reflect this significant difference.

Wefound that Archdiocesan officials used loopholes in the law to avoidreporting abuse to law enforcement authorities, and we want thoseloopholes closed. 

ThePennsylvania Child Protective Services Law currently requiresprofessionals, including clergy, to report abuse when, in the course oftheir employment, occupation or practice of their profession, they comeinto contact with children whom they have reasonable cause to suspectare abused.  The law arguably applies, however, only where the childpersonally comes before the reporter.  The statute should be amended toclarify that a mandatory reporter must report an allegation of abuse toauthorities regardless of whether the source of the report is the childhimself or herself or anyone else.

Aswe have learned from this investigation, although the Archdiocese andits employees have been mandatory reporters since at least 1996,Archdiocese officials read the law as narrowly as they could, so thatif they did not have personal contact with an abused child, they feltno obligation to report the abuse – no matter how accurate the sourceof the information.  Our proposed revision would answer this effort toenfeeble the statute: the employer must report the abuse whether helearns about it from the child or someone else having knowledge.

Wealso recommend another change affecting the reporting requirement:extend the applicable statute of limitation.  Currently, only atwo-year window applies, whether the failure to report is a one-timeoversight or, as it was here, an ongoing policy.  The reporting statutealready appropriately raises the grading of the offense where there isa pattern of failing to report.  We believe that, where such a patternexists, the statute of limitations should be increased from two yearsto five years.  An institution that steadfastly fails to report childabuse should not be immune from prosecution if it successfully managesto hide its conduct for 24 months.

Aseparate provision of the Child Protective Services law currentlyrequires background checks for applicants for employment in schools. 23Pa. C.S.A. § 6355.  Non-school employers are not obligated to performsuch checks, even if their employees and volunteers have extensivecontact with children.  We would amend the statute to require allemployers and organizations to perform background checks on all oftheir employees or volunteers who have regular contact withchildren.     

Thisproposed amendment derives from our discovery that no law requires theArchdiocese to conduct background checks of church employees who havecontact with children outside of an official school setting.  Clergyare entrusted with children in many roles – for example, as supervisorsof altar servers, as employersof children in rectory jobs, as confessors, as CYO supervisors, and aschildren's coaches.  We believe that an employer who places a person insubstantial contact with children, whether as a teacher or in any otheractivity, should have to perform a background check of that employee orvolunteer.

Currently,legal corporations can be criminally culpable if a statute so providesor if "the commission of the offense was authorized, requested,commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directorsor by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporationwithin the scope of his office or employment."  18 Pa. C.S.A. § 307. Certainly the decades-long cover-up of priest sexual abuse wasauthorized and performed by high managerial agents acting on behalf ofthe Philadelphia Archdiocese within the scope of their employment.  Butthe Archdiocese is not technically a corporation; it is insteadconsidered to be an "unincorporated association." Unincorporatedassociations like the Archdiocese can be held criminally culpable onlyif a statute expressly provides for the association's culpability.

Wedo not believe that an entity's decision to select one corporate forminstead of another should determine whether it can be criminallyprosecuted for its actions or inactions resulting in the sexual abuseof children.  Other jurisdictions do not maintain such a distinctionbased on corporate status.  We would amend 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 307 toprovide that, where a corporation would be guilty of an offenserelating to the sexual abuse of children, an unincorporated associationcommitting the same act would also be criminally culpable.